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* 
T HE United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet 
Union have received from many quarters evidence of atrocities, 
massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are being per-
petrated by Hitlerite forces in many of the countries they have over-
run and from which they are now being steadily expelled .... 
"Accordingly, the aforesaid three Allied Powers, speaking in the 
interests of the thirty-three United Nations, hereby solemnly declare 
and give full warning of their declaration as follows: At the time 
of granting of any armistice to any government which may be set 
up in Germany, these German officers and men and members of 
the Nazi Party who have been responsible for or have taken a con-
senting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions will be 
sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were 
done in order that they may be judged and punished according to 
the laws of these liberated countries and of the free governments 
which will be erected therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible 
detail from all these countries, having regard especially to invaded 
parts of the Soviet Union, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugo-
* 
slavia and Greece including Crete and other islands, to Norway, 
Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Italy. 
"Thus, Germans who take part in wholesale shooting of Polish 
officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian or Norwegian 
hostages or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in slaughters 
inflicted on the people of Poland or in territories of the Soviet 
Union which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know 
they will be brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged 
on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged. Let those 
who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood be-
ware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the 
three Allied Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of 
the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that 
justice may be done. 
"The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of Ger-
man criminals, whose offenses have no particular geographical local-
ization and who will be punished by joint decision of the Govern-
ments of the Allies." 
* 

WHAT .SHALL BE DONE 
WITH THE 
WAR CRIMINALS? 
THE vigorous Moscow Statement by President 
Roosevelt, Prime Mini~ter Churchill, and Premier Stalin on atroc-
ities has been widely discussed and debated. Few people question 
the right of the United Nations to bring the war criminals to trial 
and to punish them. But many problems will arise when this diffi-
cult job is begun. 
What is a war crime and who are the war criminals? In what 
courts shall the accused be tried? By what laws? What punish-
men ts shall be meted out to them? 
To each of these and related question there are many possible 
answers. And, if we may judge by the experience of the first World 
War,· there may not be entire agreement among the people of the 
United Nations. The following discussion, therefore, is an attempt 
to explore but not prejudge the problems that will come up in try-
ing to deal with the war criminals and in bringing them to the bar 
of just.ice. 
Let us assume that the armies of the United Nations, having 
crushed enemy resistance, have marched into Germany, Japan, and 
other Axis countries. They have taken into custody all the enemy 
leaders, both political and military, on whom they can lay their 
hands. These may include Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, Tojo, Musso-
lini, the general staffs of the German and Japanese armies together 
with the naval leaders, and the Gestapo chiefs. The catch will in-
clude the local quislings and others who have committed, or ordered 
committed, the inhuman crimes we have all rea? about. What shall 
be done with them? How shall we do justice and yet not make 
martyrs of them? 
Many ·people have a ready answer-"Shoot 'em or string 'em 
up!" But this kind of action is not consistent with our aims, nor 
with those of our Allies. It is true that a victorious power can 
impose upon a defeated power such terms as it wants to, restrained 
only by its concern for the judgment of history and its regard for 
the principles of international law. Looked at in this way, the 
problem of what to do with Axis war criminals is essentially a prob-
lem of policy and expediency rather than of legal technicality. 
But the United Nations are determined to restore law and order 
and a civilized way of life to lands now under Axis tyranny. By 
shooting or hanging even the most notorious of war criminals with-
out legal trial, we and our Allies would be charged with sinking to 
the barbaric level of our enemies. 
In civilized countries even a killer caught with a smoking gun in 
his hand is entitled to a fair trial. The laws and customs to which 
all civilized states adhere require that a man who commits a crime 
be tried in an orderly legal way and given an opportunity to defend 
himself. 
WHO ARE THE WAR CRIMINALS? 
Before we can consider how and where to bring the war criminals 
to justice, and what punishments to administer, we must determine 
who they are. 
We have mentioned some of the groups of men who, most author-
ities believe, belong to the class of war criminals. Yet, few will say 
that all Nazi, Fascist, or Japanese soldiers, sailors, or marines who 
may have committed crimes against the military or civilian mem-
bers of the United Nations are war criminals. Many are themselves 
victims of a tyrannical political or military system. 
Considering the Axis views and conduct of "total war," war crim-
inals can legitimately be defined, according to some authorities, as 
persons, regardless of political or military rank, who during t~e war 
in their official capacity have committed acts which violated (a) the 
2 
laws and customs of legitimate warfare or (b) the principles of 
criminal law that are generally observed in civilized legal systems, 
or who have ordered, consented to, or conspired in the commission 
of such acts. 
This definition, we must note, does not include three types of 
crime and criminals which many people associate with war-espe-
cially with this war: 
First, the crime of violating a solemn treaty signed between na-
tions or of starting a war of aggression. No agreement has been 
reached among nations, nor rules of law set down, for punishing 
treaty violators, either in national or international courts-though 
such rules were recommended to the Preliminary Peace Conference 
at the close of World War I. 
Second, crimes, such as theft, rape, or murder, committed by 
soldiers, sailors, or marines on their own initiative and not in con-
nection with military operations. Men accused of these crimes may 
be tried by national tribunals, either military or civil. 
Third, the treason of government officials or party leaders, such 
as Pierre Laval of France or Vidkun Quisling of Norway, who 
helped deliver up their countries to the enemy. Treason is a crime 
with which the courts of each country, not outside tribunals, are 
properly suited to deal. 
So much for what the definition does not include. It does include, 
however, three types of persons who may not be regarded as war 
criminals by some authorities : 
First among these are officers or officials who, according to the 
Moscow Statement, took "a consenting part in," that is, h ad the 
power and authority to prevent the atrocities, massacres, and execu-
tions, but failed to stop them. 
Second, the defirtition includes not only military leaders but 
political chieftains. Under Germany's conception of "total war" 
there is little difference between the cruelties of the Gestapo (the 
civilian undercover police ), the notorious "S.S." (the Nazi Party's 
private army to keep the German people in check), and "Death 
_ Head" guards at concentration camps, and the cruelties of strictly 
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"On August 21 I said that this Government was con-
stantly receiving information concerning the barbaric crimes 
being committed by the enemy against civilian populations 
in occupied countries, particularly on the continent of Eu-
rope. I said it was the purpose of this Government} as I 
knew it to be the purpose of the other United Nations, to 
see that when victory i won the perpetrators of these crimes 
shall answer for them before courts of law. 
"The commi sion of these crimes continues. 
"I now declare it to be the intention of this Government 
that the successful close of the war shall incll!de provision 
for the surrender to the United Nations of war criminals. 
"With a view to establishing responsibility of the guilty 
individuals through the collection and assessment of all 
available evidence, this Government is prepared to coop-
erate with the British and other Governments in establish-
ing a. United Nations Commission for the Investigation of 
War Crimes. 
"The number of persons eventually found guilty will un-
doubtedly be extremely small compared to the total enemy 
populations. It is not the intention of this Government or 
·of the Governments associated with us to resort to mass re-
prisals. It is our intention that just and sure punishment 
shall be meted out to the ringleaders responsible for the 
organized murder of thousands of innocent persons and the 
commission of atrocities which have violated every tenet of 
the Christian faith." (President Roosevelt, October 7, 1942.) 
4 
military officers. Perhaps the fonner can be more appropriately 
tried, however, for violations of ordinary common and statutory 
criminal law than for acts contrary to the laws and customs of 
legitimate warfare. 
Finally, the definition includes businessmen and industrialists of 
prestige and power who indirectly participated in or conspired to 
commit crimes, especially those who shared, often by prearrange-
ment, in. the loot of countries overrun by the Axis armies. This group 
might include officials of the 1. G. Farben, Goering, Krupp, Thys-
sen, and Mannesmann trusts in Germany and the Mitsui and other 
Japanese business clans. These officials, as principals, accessories, 
or conspirators, might be tried for robberies and thefts actually com-
mitted by the military and political leaders .. 
THE RULES OF WARFARE AND THEIR VIOLATION 
The nations of the world, including our enemies, have at different 
times signed treaties governing the conduct of war and outlawing 
certain kinds of behavior by the forces of the belligerents. The most 
relevant sources of this written law are (1) the Hague Convention 
of 1899 relating to the laws and customs of war on land; ·(2) a 
revision and extension of this issued in 1907; (3) a convention 
regulating the treatment of prisoners of war; and (4) a Red Cross 
convention regarding the treatment of wounded and sick members 
of armies in the field. The last two were signed in Geneva in 1929. 
In addition, certain kinds of behavior are prohibited not only by 
these international agreements but by the customary or common law 
of warfare as well. T he provisions of the conventions (written law) 
and also many of the provisions of the common law of warfare 
(unwritten law) are embodied in the military manuals of civilized 
states. For the American Army, the relevant law is contained in 
FM 27~10, R ules of Land Warfare, which summarizes the viola-
tions of the laws and customs of warfare most frequently involved, 
as follows: 
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"Offenses by armed forces.- The principal offenses of this class 
are: Making use of poisoned and otherwise forbidden arms and 
ammunition; killing of the wounded; refusal of quarter; treacher-
ous request for quarter; . . . ill-treatment of prisoners of war; . . .. 
firing on undefended localities; . . . misuse of the Red Cross flag 
and emblem . . . ; bombardment of hospital3 and other privileged 
buildings; improper use of privileged buildings for military pur-
poses; poisoning of wells and streams; pillage and purposeless de-
struction; ill-treatment of inhabitants in occupied territory." (Para-
graph 347, FM 27-10.) 
Some of these offenses (for example, refusal of quarter) can only 
be military crimes, but ill-treatment of inhabitants in occupied terri-
tory, if it results in death, can be prosecuted as "murder in violation 
of the laws and customs of warfare." 
Offenses against Belligerents 
German and Japanese troops have violated many if not most of 
the laws and customs of war. Thousands of such instances have 
been and are being recorded by the American, Russian, Polish, 
Dutch, Norwegian, and other governments. Some of these records 
are already in print, and we shall draw a few typical examples from 
documents published by the nations concerned. These examples 
illustrate the scope of the atrocities which the Axis is charged with 
having committed. We may usefully begin with some cases relating 
to the violations of the duties of a belligerent toward enemy troops: 
Paragraphs 32 and 33 of Rules of Land Warfare affirm that "it 
is especially forbidden ... to kill or wound an enemy who, having 
laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defense, has sur-
rendered at discretion" and that "it is especially forbidden ... to 
declare that no quarter will be given." 
The Polish Ministry of Information, in a compilation of Nazi 
atrocities. published in 1942, charges that "After the capitulation of 
the fortress of Modlin, heroically defended until the moment of the 
surrender of Warsaw, the Germans in one sector of the front mur-
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dered a whole platoon of captured Polish soldiers. They ordered 
them to kneel down and raise their arms, then shot them all with 
machine-guns. Several Polish officers who had been seized, were 
also shot in the same way. Others were transported to Zakroczym, 
where they were placed against a wall and shot. On September 2 
and 3, 1939, between Rybnik and Wadzim, in Silesia, the Germans 
captured a detachment of the 12th Infantry Regiment. They took 
no prisoners, but threw the men to the ground, and drove over their 
bodies with tanks." (Black Book of Poland~ pp. 116-117.) , 
Rules of Land Warfare (paragraph 73, FM 27-10) declare that 
"prisoners of war are in the power of the enemy power, but not of 
the individuals or bodies of troops who capture them. They must 
at all times be treated with humanity and protected, particularly 
against acts of violence, insults, and public curiosity. Measures of 
reprisal against them are prohibited." 
According to the representations of Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull to the Japanese government, as published in the Bulletin of 
the Department of State, February 12, 1944, the Japanese have 
savagely. disregarded these rights of American and Filipino soldiers. 
"Prisoners of war who were marched from Bataan to San Fernando 
in April 1942 were brutally treated by Japanese guards. The guards 
clubbed prisoners who tried to get water, and one prisoner was hit 
on the head with a club for helping a fellow prisoner who had been 
knocked down by a Japanese army truck. A colonel who pointed 
to a can of salmon by the side of the road and asked for food for 
the prisoners was struck on the side of his head with the can by a 
Japanese officer. The colonel's face was cut open. Another colonel 
who had found a sympathetic Filipino with a cart was horsewhipped 
in the face for trying to give transportation to persons unable to 
walk ..•. An American Lieutenant Colonel was killed by a Jap-
anese as he broke ranks to get a drink at a stream ... Americans 
were ... tortured and shot without trial at Cabanatuan in June 
or July 1942 because they endeavored to bring food into the camp. 
After being tied to a fence post inside the camp for two days they 
were shot." 
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Rules of Land Warfare (paragraph 86, FM 27-10) provide that 
"Belligerents shall be bound to take all sanitary measures necessary 
to assure the cleanliness and healthfulness of camps and to prevent 
epidemics. Prisoners of war shall have at their disposal, day and 
night, installations conforming to sanitary rules and constantly main-
tained in a state of cleanliness." 
Conditions maintained by the Japanese in the prison camps were 
a far cry from this humane provision. "At Camp O'Donnell con-
ditions were so bad that 2,200 Americans and more than 20,000 
Filipinos are reliably reported to have died in the first few months 
of their detention. There is no doubt that a large number of these 
deaths could have been prevented had the Ja.panese authorities 
provided minimum medical care for the prisoners. The so-called 
hospital there was absolutely inadequate to m eet the situation. 
Pri oners of war lay sick and naked on the floor, receiving no 
attention and too sick to move from their own excrement. The 
hospital was so overcrowded that Americans were laid on the 
ground outside in the heat of the blazing sun. The American 
doctors in the camp were given no medicine, and even had no 
water to wash the human wa te from the bodies of the patients. 
Eventually, when quinine was issued, there was only enough prop-
erly to take care of ten cases of malaria, while thousands of pris-
oners were suffering from the disease .... It is reported that in 
the autumn of 1943 fifty percent of the American prisoners of war 
at Davao had a poor chance to live and that the detaining author-
ities had again cut the prisoners' food ration and had withdrawn 
all medical attention ." 
The code of warfare among civilized nations prohibits the im-
position of "punishments other than those provided for the same 
acts for soldiers of the national armies ... upon prisoners of war 
by the military authorities and courts of the detaining power." 
(Paragraph 119, FM 27-10.) 
Yet, to quote Secretary Hull again, ""American personnel have 
suffered death and imprisonment for participation in military op-
erations. Death and long-term imprisonment have been imposed 
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for attempts to escape for which the maximum penalty under the 
Geneva Convention i thirty days arrest." 
Offenses against Civilians 
The rules governing the treatment of civilians in time of war are 
as tolerant and for~earing as those relating. to belligerents. When 
a territory is captured, "The authority of the legitimate power hav-
ing in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall 
take all measures in his power to restore, and insure, as far as possi-
ble, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely pre-
vented, the laws in force in the country." (Paragraph 282, FM 
27-10.) 
This safeguard for the welfare and property of civilians who 
happen to find themselves in occupied countries has been consist-
ently ignored by the Axis armies. Indeed, it is doubtful whether in 
the entire history of man's cruelty to man there is anything which 
surpasses the butcheries of Jews, Poles, Russians, French, Italians, 
Greeks, and other peoples caught in the Nazi sweep across the 
European Continent. The acts of torture and murder of thousands 
of men, women, and children in their homes, streets, and barricaded 
ghettos, in death houses specially constructed for the use of live 
steam or gas fumes as a lethal weapon, of the forcing of victims to 
dig their own graves-these acts have been so numerous as to re-
quire many volumes to recount . them. 
For example, "In Lublin and the vicinity on the night of March 
23 and 24, the Jewish population was simply driven out of their 
homes, and the sick and the infirm were killed on the spot. In the 
Jewish orphanage 108 children from the age of two to nine were 
taken outside the town together with their nurses and murdered. 
Altogether that night, 2,500 people were massacred and the remain-
ing 2,600 Jews in Lublin were removed to the concentration camps 
at Beliec, and Trawniki .... Mass murders occurred on such a 
large scale at Rawa Ruska and Bilgoraj that Jewish communities 
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have ceased to exist. ... In Mielec about 1,300 Jews were slaugh-
tered on March 9; in Mir 2,000 Jews were killed; in Nowogr6dek, 
2,500; in Wolozyn, 1,800; in Kajdan6w 4,000 were killed. Thirty 
thousand Jews from Hamburg were deported to Minsk where they 
were all murdered." (Black Book of Poland~ p. 579.) Since these 
acts have not the remotest relation to warfare, they constitute ordi-
nary murders in violation of the penal codes of most civilized states. 
Not only have the Nazis shot people in systematic massacres and 
boasted of it, as in the razing of the Czech town of Lidice, but they 
have terrorized the inhabitants of occupied countries by seizing and 
murdering hostages for the slightest infraction of rules-many of 
them arbitrary and capricious-which they laid down. 
According to Rules ,of Land Warfare (paragraph 343, FM 27-
10 ) , "No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted 
upon the population on account of acts of individuals for which 
they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible." Yet, 
as recorded in the Black Book~ "People were hunted down in the 
town, on the pretext that an attempt had been made to fire at 
German soldiers from one of the houses .... About sixty people 
were seized and shot. One of the houses in the Street of The Blessed 
Virgin Mary was set on fire by the Germans, after they had thrown 
hand grenades into it. There were many persons inside ... . It was 
forbidden to bury or to remove the bodies of those who had been 
shot, the object being to terrorize the inhabitants by the sight of 
these corpses. They were left unburied until two days later." (Black 
Book of Poland, p. 22.) 
"As the German authorities had issued an order the previous day 
. .. that all arms were to be surrendered before 8 P.M., there was 
a general search for arms. In the Institute of the Order of the 
School Brothers, an old gun and several Scouts' caps were found 
in the theatre wardtobe. On the false pretext that they had been 
'concealing arms,' two of the Friars and the father of another were 
taken out and shot in the barrack square of the 27th Infantry Regi-
ment. Their bodies were buried in the barrack garden. Many per-
sons were shot simply because toy pistols had been found in their 
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houses, or old sabres which had been forgotten among the lumber 
in attics." (Black Book of Poland> pp. 22-23.) 
Rules of Land Warfare (paragraph 299, FM 27-10) order bel-
ligerents to respect "family honor and rights, the lives of persons." 
The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs charges, in the Polish White 
Book, issued in 1942, that "Under pretense of arresting prostitutes, 
patrols of German soldiers organized regular raids to carry off young 
women. A patrol of the 228th regiment of German infantry organ-
ized such a raid in one of the quarters by the river early in 1940. 
'soldiers of the 7th anti-aircraft regiment did the same thing twice 
in the suburb of Mokotow. Women were taken not only in the 
streets but also from their homes. These young unfortunates were 
carried off to the barracks of the German soldiers and raped." 
(Pp. 229-230.) . 
Other provisions of Rules of Land Warfare order belligerents to 
respect the "religious convictions and practice" of peoples in occu-
pied territories, as well as to spare, as far as possible, "buildings 
dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitaqle purposes, historic 
monuments," and "places where the sick and wounded are collected, 
provided that they are not being used at the time for military pur-
poses." Likewise "The property of municipalities, that of institu-
tions dedicated to religion, charity, and education, the arts and 
sciences, even when State property" should be treated as private 
property, and all seizures of or destruction to such institutions, hi -
toric monuments, and works of art or science are prohibited. (Para-
graphs 58, 299, 318, FM 27-10.) 
I:Q a volume of Soviet War Documents, published in 1943, the 
Soviet Embassy in Washington states that "Churches in Gzhat k 
were turned into stables and warehouses. The Germans set up an 
abattoir for cattle in Blagoveshchensky Church. The Predtechen-
skaya Church and Kazan Cathedral were blown up. The wells in 
the town were poisoned and mined. In Sychevka, of 1,000 dwelling 
houses 770 were blown up or burned. The museum was burned. 
Over 5,000 paintings, including works by Repin, Levitan, Perov, 
Aivazovsky, Korovin and others; sculptures by Antokolsky; and 
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gold, silver and bronze articles by masters of the 17th, 18th and 
19th Centuries perished in the fire ... . The following wtHe blown 
up or burned: three secondary and two primary schools, vocational 
schools .. . a library, a hospital, a restaurant, two children's homes, 
the water-pumping tower, the town polyclinic, the telegraph office, 
the radio station and other buildings." (Pp. 163-164.) 
These are but a few examples of the many atrocities charged 
against the war criminals. Illustrations could be drawn from every 
occupied country in Europe and Asia. Who is liable for them? 
The commissioned officers who issue the orders for pillaging and 
sacking cities and murdering civilians? The political chieftains who 
set down the policies that are executed by the military commanders? 
The rank and file of the Axis armies who pull the triggers of gun 
that kill hostages, or carry the torches that set fire to buildings~ or 
plant the dynamite that blows up schools, churches, libraries, mu-
seums? Is a soldier liable for crimes he is ordered to commit? 
To try to answer these questions we must first go back and see 
what happened after the last World War and study the effort made 
to define war crimes and to punish war criminals. 
WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THE LAST WAR? 
As we have seen, the Moscow Statement (which does not deal 
with the Japanese because Russia is not at war with Japan) pro-
claims that, after the armistice, the German war criminals will be 
returned to the scenes of their crimes for trial and punishment by 
local courts. In translating this declaration into action after the war, 
the United Nations may (;ncounter some complex problems. 
Let us, for example, see what was done after the last World War. 
What is the history of the action taken against war offenders under 
the Treaty of Versailles? On January 25, 1919 the Preliminary 
Peace Conference set up a Commission of Fifteen to study the vio-
lations of international law chargeable to Gennany and her .allie . 
The Commission's majority report declared that a belligerent may 
try enemy persons charged with violations of the laws and customs 
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of war, and for this purpose it may set up its own military or civil 
courts and use its own trial procedure. Most of the war crimes were 
therefore to be tried in the military tribunals or ordinary criminal 
courts of the injured nation. 
The Commis ion declared, however, that four types of charges 
called for trial before an international tribunal: (1) offenses against 
civilians and soldiers of the Allied nations, such as outrages in prison 
camps; (2) offenses by "persons of authority ... whose orders 
affected the conduct of operations" against the Allied armies; 
(:1) offense by civil or military authorities, "without distinction of 
rank," who either ordered or "abstained from preventing ... vio-
lations of the laws or customs of war"; and (4) charges against 
sundry other perwns, belonging to enemy countries, whom-having 
regard for the character of the offense or limitations of the law of 
the injured state-it might be advisable to prosecute in an inter-
national court. 
For these four classes of cases, the Commission recommended that 
a "High Tribunal" be set up, the judges appointed by the Allied 
governments. This court could determine its own procedures and 
apply "the principles of the law of nations as they result from the 
usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of hu-
manity and from the dictates of public conscience." Punishments 
ould be imposed in accordance with what is customary "in any 
country represented on the tribunal or in the country of the con-
victed per on." 
. 
The Versailles Treaty 
The e recommendations of the Commission of Fifteen were, how-
ever, not adopted by the Peace Conference. Objections were raised, 
especially by the American and Japanese members of the Commis-
sion. The Americans disapproved of the creation of an international 
crinJinal court, "for which," they said, "a precedent is lacking, and 
which appears to be unknown in the practice of nations." They 
also rejected the doctrine that failure to prevent violations of the 
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laws and customs of war is a criminal act. The Americans and 
Japanese particularly disliked the idea that, if the Commission' 
recommendations were carried out, the head of a state, such as the 
Kaiser, could be brought before a court set up by his enemies. 
And so, instead of following the majority views of the Commis-
sion of Fifteen, a milder approach toward war criminals was taken 
in the Treaty of Versailles. No provision was made for an inter-
national criminal court except that Article 227 provided for a "spe-
cial tribunal" to try the former Kaiser. This tribunal was to be 
composed of five judges, one each to be appointed by the United 
States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. Since Holland 
refused to extradite him, the tribunal was never set up . By Article 
228, however, the German government recognized the right of the 
Allies "to bring before military tribunals persons accused of having 
committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war." The 
German government undertook to hand over the accused to the 
Allied governments. 
Article 229 provided for the trial of the accused before military 
tribunals of the nations where their alleged crimes were committed. 
Every defendant was to be permitted to name his own counsel. 
By Article 230 the German government undertook to furnish all 
the documents and data relevant to the trials. 
The Lists of Accused 
Accordingly, lists of war criminals were made up by each of the 
principal Allied governments, from which a joint sample list of 
about 900 names was handed to the Germans on February 3, 1920. 
France demanded the surrender of 334 persons, among them the 
Crown Prince, Marshal von Hindenburg, Count Bismarck (grand-
son of the Iron Chancellor), and General Stenger, who was accused 
of having ordered his men to massacre all prisoners, including the 
wounded. . 
The British claimed 100 Germans, among them Grand Admiral 
von Tirpitz and Admiral Scheer, for having ordered submarines 
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ruthlessly to sink Allied ships, and some 20 former commandants of 
German prison camps, for extreme cruelty. 
Belgium caJled for the delivery of 265 Germans, including ex-
Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, allegedly responsible for the 
violation of Belgium's neutrality. Poland, Romania, Italy, and Yu-
goslavia also demanded the surrender of many high-placed offend-
ers-for murder, arson, theft, pillage, wanton destruction, bombard-
ment of open towns, and similar offenses. 
Although, in signing the Treaty of Versailles, the German gov-
ernment obligated itself to deliver up the accused, it soon refused 
to do so. In Germany, feeling ran high when the Allied list was 
published. Mass meetings of protest were held and everywhere the 
surrender of the war criminals was denounced. 
On January 25, 1920-even before the list of 900 was presented-
Germany had proposed, as a compromise, that all persons charged 
by the Allies with war crimes and misdemeanors should be tried be-
fore the Supreme Court of the Reich at Leipzig. As evidence of its 
determination to punish its own people, the German government 
declared that it had brought about the passage of a law on De-
cember 13, 1919 providing for the prosecution of war offenders. 
After an exchange of many diplomatic notes, the Allies in May 
1920 agreed to deliver to the Germans a sample list of 45 war crim-
inals for trial at Leipzig. To this list the British contributed only 7 
selected names. 
The Leipzig Trials 
At last the trial of the war criminals began at Leipzig on May 23, 
1921- two and a half years after the Armistice. The duty of trying 
their own countrymen fell upon the seven judges of the Criminal 
Senate of the German Imperial Court of Justice. 
Many of the accused could allegedly not be found by the Ger-
mans. For example, the whereabouts of Commander Patzig-whose 
V-boat had torpedoed the British hospital ship Llandovery Castle 
without warning and had then fired upon and sunk lifeboats con-
taining the survivors--"T"was said to be unknown, although he had an 
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address in Danzig. His lieutenant commander could not be traced 
at all, while another officer had taken refuge in Poland. In con-
nection with the Llandove.ry Castle atrocity only Lieutenants Lud-
wig Dithmar and John Boldt were put on trial--on the initiative of 
the German government. , 
Others who were tried included General Stenger, accused of 
ordering the massacre of prisoners, and Captain Emil Miiller, 
charged with maintaining such bad conditions at his prison camp 
that hundreds of men died. 
Altogether 12 men were tried at Leipzig-2 on German charges, 
4 on 'British, 5 on French, and 1 on Belgian. Of these 12 men, 6 
were convicted. The sentences imposed included: on German 
charges, 2 of four years; on British charges, 2 of six months and 
1 of ten months; on French charges, 1 of two years. The French 
case involved a German major prosecuted for killing wounded 
French war prisoners, allegedly on General Stenger's orders. The 
General himself was acquitted despite much evidence against him 
by German witnesses. Crowds applauded his acquittal and admirers 
gave him flowers. 
The Allied mission sent to Leipzig withdrew in protest against 
the outcome of the 12 cases. The French particularly were angered 
and saddened; they and the Belgians, who had suffered most from 
German atrocities, indignantly withdrew the documents of accusa-
tion and proof. To them, the trials were clearly a miscarriage of 
justice. On the other hand, certain prominent Br~tish observers 
thought that the German court had done a fairly good job under 
great handicaps. 
After the Allied observers had left Leipzig, some 800 other cases 
of war crimes came to the attention of the German Court, but the 
German authorities disposed of all of them by discontinuing the 
proceedings, usually on the grounds of insufficient evidence. 
In January 1922 a Commission of Allied Jurists, set up to inquire 
into the business, unanimously declared that it was useless to let the 
Leipzig court continue and recommended that the German govern-
ment be compelled to hand over the accused persons for trial by 
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the Allies under Article 228 of the Versailles Treaty. German 
groups, however, organized protest meetings at which high-ranking 
German officers reminded the Allies that "250,000 soldiers and the 
police of the Reichswehr" were ready to prevent the handing over 
of Germans to the "justice of the Entente." 
It is significant to note that of the 6 men convicted, the 2 with 
the longest terms soon escaped from the house of detention (not a 
prison) under suspicious circumstances. Thus ended the fiasco of 
bringing the German war criminals to trial. 
Lessons' of Leipzig 
What are the lessons learned from the Leipzig trials? 
First, we cannot trust the enemy to bring his own nationals to 
justice. 
Second, surrender of the leading malefactors might be made one 
of the conditions of the armistice at the end of World War II. 
Third, the men accused of war crimes should be tried as soon as 
po sible. Otherwise witnesses will almost certainly disappear or 
die off and evidence will be lost. 
Fourth, most of the preparation for the trials should be handled 
by United Nations officials. 
Fifth, fair yet not long-drawn-out proceedings should be held. 
Sixth, public opinion in enemy countries should be prepared to 
recognize the justice of punishing leaders who are guilty of shock-
ing crimes. 
Finally, the Leipzig trials and their aftermath show that in the 
difficult business of dealing with war criminals the United Nations 
must be truly united and of one opinion. Disagreement among the 
Allies encouraged the Germans to resist the Allied demands for 
the criminals. 
The Leipzig trials bring up certain legal questions which we need 
to consider here. Under what law, for instance, shall the United 
Nations proceed in dealing with war criminals? In what courts 
should they be tried? How shall a soldier's defense-that he com-
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"I have repeatedly said that unconditional surrender 
gives the enemy no rights, but it relieves us from no duty. 
Justice will have to be done and retribution will fall upon 
the wicked and cruel. Miscreants who set out to subjugate 
first Europe and then the world must be punished. So 
must their agents who in so many countries have perpe-
trated horrible crimes. They must be brought to face the 
judgment of the populations they have outraged to the 
very scenes of their atrocities." (Prime Minister Churchill, 
May 25, ]944. ) 
mitted atrocities only In obedience to his superior's orders- be 
treated? 
Can chiefs of state, like Hitler, be legally tried and punished? 
How shall the accused be got hold of and the guilty pun-
ished? What steps shall be taken now to ensure the successful 
application of justice at the end of the war? 
Let us take up the first question first. 
UNDER WHAT LAWS SHALL THE UNITED NATIONS 
PROCEED? 
Most international lawyers argue that the law of nations is bind-
ing only on sovereign states and not on individuals. In other words, 
the individual offender can be punished only under the law of his 
own or the injured nation. Furthermore, international lawyers are 
inclined to argue that when it comes to individuals who violate 
the laws and customs of warfare, international law-as, say, in the. 
Hague conventions-provides neither courts nor punishments. 
Yet, a good case can be made for the view that the common or 
customary law of nations does in fact pennit the trial of individuals 
and does provide punishment-the death penalty. In the case of 
piracy this has long been so. 
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Violations of the laws and customs of legitimate warfare are the 
very kind, some authorities believe, for which individuals ought to 
be liable under the law of nations. Not only do soldiers of the Axis 
powers enjoy the protection of the laws of warfare when they fall 
into the hands of the United Nations, but these nations bring to 
trial and punish their own soldiers who violate the laws and customs 
of legitimate warfare or the principles of civilized criminal law. 
Why, then, should not enemy soldiers be tried and punished for 
similar offenses? 
The German Supreme Court, during the Leipzig trials, had to 
acknowledge the fact that the law of nations was binding upon 
individuals. In the trial involving the Llandovery Castle, the court 
aid: "The fact that his deed is a violation of international law 
must be well-known to the doer .... The rule ... here involved 
i simple and is universally known. . . . The court must in this 
instance affirm [Commander] Patzig's guilt of killing contrary to 
international law." 
Since World War I there have been adequate precedents and 
authority for a belligerent to punish, under its own laws, enemy 
violators of the laws and customs of war. Both German and 
American jurists agree that when a state wishes, as a matter of 
justice, to punish such an offender, the fact that it has not pre-
viously enacted a penal code to suit the crime is irrelevant. Thus, 
an American authority on international law, discussing the case of 
the saboteurs who were executed in 1942, declared that the decision 
which our Supreme Court affirmed "is impressive judicial testi- " 
mony to the effect not only that the law of war ... is a part of 
the local law, but also that its applicability by the courts .. . need 
not await precise legislative appraisal or definition." 
It would indeed be a mockery of justice for an Axis officer to 
claim that because no specific code of international criminal law 
exists, he did not know that such actions as the slaughter or en-
lavement of innocent civilians, or the torture of prisoners are 
forbidden. 
Should we be bound by the theory that only the state and not 
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also the soldier is liable for his violations of the laws of war? In 
answering this question it should be remembered that the typical 
remedies against a state (for example, protest through neutrals, the 
taking of measures of reprisal, and the imposition of a "fine" by 
way of postwar indemnity) have been shown by experience in both 
world wars to be unsatisfactory. for making a lawless state respect 
the laws and customs of warfare. Action against individual offend-
ers is far more effective. 
TRIAL BY LOCAL COURTS 
The vast majority of war criminals will be dealt with as pre-
scribed in the Moscow agreement; that i , they will be returned 
to the scenes of their crimes for trial and punishment by local 
courts and under local laws. If the legal system of the prosecuting 
state so provides, some enemy offenders may be tried in ordinary 
criminal courts for violating the domestic penal laws. But most 
of them will probably come before military tribunals for violation 
of the laws and customs of warfare. The recent trial at Kharkov. 
in which three German officers and a Russian traitor were con-
victed by a Soviet military court and hanged for atrocities, is an 
example of how war criminals of this class will be dealt with. 
Since there has been no opportunity for the commission of Nazi 
or Fascist war crimes on American territory, there will presumably 
be no call that Germans, Italians, or other Axis nationals be "re-
turned to the scene of their crimes" for trial in American courts. 
However, under the principle of the Moscow Statement, the United 
States will have a hand in the trial and punishment of Japanese 
war criminals wJ:lOse offenses took place in Wake, Guam, the 
Philippine Islands, the Aleutians, and other Pacific areas. 
There will also be charges of war crimes committed against 
Americans on European and Asiatic battle fronts. While the 
Moscow Statement does not make clear what will be done about 
such offenses, the United States will be entitled to have the decid-
_ ing voice in the disposition of the accused. By the same token, once 
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having participated in the joint United Nations determination of 
who are the war criminals, and having helped in the distribution 
of the accused among the various victimized countries, the United 
States will have no voice in how those countries apply their own 
laws and legal procedures. 
As we have seen, many atrocities have already been investigated 
and the accused listed by governmental commission and by the 
United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes, 
which has been sitting in London since the middle of 1943. 
The Soviet government has set up numerous commissions to 
collect evidence of atrocities in recaptured parts of the USSR. These 
have already drawn up detailed accusations. The following is 
typical, covering the chief instigators of crimes as well as the soldiers 
who allegedly carried them out. "For the crimes committed in the 
city of Orel and the Orel Region; for the mass murders of guiltless 
peaceful residents; for the murders and tortures of wounded and 
sick war prisoners; for the plundering and abducting of Soviet 
citizens to German slavery; for the destruction of collective farms, 
villages and towns; for th.e looting of the properties of State, 
cooperative and public institutions-the Extraordinary State Com-
mittee holds responsible the commander of the Second German 
Tank Army, General Schmidt; the commander of the Orel admin-
istrative area and military commandant of the city, Major General 
Hamann, and also the direct executors of these monstrous crimes: 
"The chief of the Orel camp for war prisoners, Major Hofmann; 
the assistant chief of the Orel war prisoners' camp, Captain Matern, 
the garrison doctor Ehrlich, the German doctor Schirmann; the 
German doctor at the war prisoners' camp, Kuper; chief of th(:: 
'labor exchange' Lowe ... ; chief of the economic kommandatur 
Schmidt, chief of the camp of the 'labor exchange' Loch, Sergeant 
Majors Winkler, Stricke and Scholz and Corporal Die!. All of ' 
them must bear severe punishment for the monstrous crimes they 
have committed against the Soviet people during the temporary 
occupation by the German-fascist troops of the city of Orel and 
the 'Orel Region." (Soviet War Documents, pp. 185-186.) 
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TRIAL BY INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 
While most war criminals will end . up in the toils of local law-
enforcement agencies, certain offenders and offenses call for trial 
by an international tribunal. The Moscow agreement evidently 
recognized this, for it affirmed that the declaration did not apply 
to "German criminals, whose offenses have no particular geo-
graphical localization and who will be punished by joint decision 
of the Allies." It may reasonably be assumed that the offenders 
covered by this provision are those responsible for the wholesale ' 
atrocities, such as Hitler, Tojo, members of their general staffs, 
political leaders, the Gestapo, fascist militia, and others. Their 
crimes have been carried out on an international scale and affect 
the interests of all civilized peoples in the maintenance of law and 
order on an international plane. 
United action in these cases could be taken by a joint or mixed 
military tribunal, as provided in Article 229 of the Versailles Treaty, 
or by a new international criminal court. 
To avoid confusion, the joint military tribunal, it has been sug-
gested, might follow the procedure of the prosecuting state, that is, 
the state that took the initiative in filing charges against the in-
dividual. Its military law, whether English, American, Belgian, 
Chinese, Russian, Polish, or other, could be enforced by the joint 
court. The choice of the prosecuting state might be by agreement 
among the United Nations, depending upon such factors as which 
had suffered the greatest injury from the crime, whose law and 
procedure is the easiest to apply, and the like. The case might well 
be entitled The United Nations ex reI. The United Kingdom v. 
Adolf Hitler,· or The United Nations ex reI. The United States of 
America v. Hideki T ojo. 
If a true international criminal court is set up, it would embrace 
practically all the nations of the world. Thus it would be the agent 
of civilized humanity in general and would mainly apply the law of 
nations. How would it proceed? An international criminal court 
could apply (1) a penal code covering crimes against the family 
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of nations, or (2) the common law of nations supplemented by the 
Hague and Geneva conventions referred to on page 5 and the 
principles underlying and common to most civilized systems of 
penal law. 
Since the first code does not yet exist, the question arises whether 
such a court could lawfully carryon its work. Although some 
authorities do not think that it could, it seems, to others, legitimate 
to conclude that if the United Nations (and other states who may 
wish to join) enter into an agreement to establish an international 
court, they could assign to it their recognized individual powers to 
try war offenders, and the court would be enforcing law commonly 
recognized. This court could, therefore, begin to function without 
the prior enactment of an international penal code. But some 
guidance would nevertheless have to be given the court-as was 
done in the case of the World Court established at the Hague after 
the last World War-as to the sources of the law it would apply. 
It might derive its law from (1) international conventions, expressly 
recognized by the nations involved; (2 ) international custom as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (3) the general 
principles of law (particularly criminal law) recognized by civilized 
nations; and (4) judicial decisions and the teaching of the best 
authorities of the various nations. 
These sources of law would take account of legitimate defenses 
and mitigating circumstances, such as insanity, self-defense, killing 
by order of an official or a court, killing in lawful battle, and the like. 
Punishment would be meted out according to the seriousness of the 
crime, as under civilized law-that is, murder would be punishable 
by death or life imprisonment, other crimes by terms of years. There 
would be lesser penalties, doubtless, such as fines or loss of civil 
rights. Practically all legal systems include elements of fair play 
which would guarantee the accused adequate counsel and a chance 
to be heard in self-defense. 
It is reasonable to conclude, then, that a detailed international 
penal code would not have to be enacted by agreement of all the 
civilized nations of the world before the international tribunal goes 
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to work. Such a code would be, in es ence, only declaratory of 
legal principles already in existence. 
How Would This Court Be Staffed? 
The chief statesmen of the United Nations might nominate the 
judges from among those jurists who are acknowledged authorities 
on criminal law. The prosecuting staff, as well as public defenders, 
might be nominated from panels submitted by the chief executives 
of the countries establishing the court. Procedure might consist of 
the best features of Anglo-American and, Continental criminal pro-
ceedings. Rules of evid.ence could be simple. Appeal to a higher 
or appellate branch of the court might be only sparingly provided 
for in order to avoid unreasonable manipulation of the processes of 
justice. This sketch of the manner in which the war criminals 
might be tried by the United Nations leaves some basic legal ques-
tions unanswered: Can an accused member of the Axis nations 
plead that he was following the orders of a superior when he com-
mitted an atrocity? And are chiefs of state liable to prosecution 
in foreign courts for their crimes? 
ARE "SUPERIOR ORDERS" A LEGITIMATE DEFENSE? 
One of the most difficult p:r:oblems to be faced in trying war 
criminals is that of determining the guilt of men who claim that 
they were acting under orders of their superior-that they did not 
commit offenses of their own free will. . 
You will find in paragraph 347 of the Rules of Land Warfare 
the following statement: "Individuals of the armed forces will not 
be punished for these offenses [violations of the customs and laws 
of war] in case they are committed under the orders or sanction of 
their government or commanders. The commanders ordering the 
commission of such acts, or under whose authority they are com-
mitted by their troops, may be punished by the belligerent into 
whose hands they may fall." 
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Notice that under this rule the ordinary soldier is excused but 
his commander or government is liable. If this rule is continued it 
will not be easy to get at the guilty "commander." Is he the lieu-
tenant who qrders a squad of soldiers to machine gun innocent 
hostages? Or the captain who issued the order to the lieutenant? 
Or the major? Or the colonel? Or the general from whom the 
original command came? One can climb higher' and higher until 
only the chief of state-Hitler or Tojo-is reached, and he, accord-
ing to many authorities, cannot be tried at all ! 
The question is being raised whether the rule as to superior 
orders should not be changed. It should be noted that it did not 
enter the American Rules until 1914. Before that, the Rules failed 
to mention "superior orders," and American courts martial upheld 
the principle that a soldier obeying his commander's orders is not 
protected if the order is unlawful. 
Admittedly, the ordinary soldier is in a tough spot. Ordered to 
commit an abominable deed, he mayor may not L l :0W that under 
the laws of civilized warfare it is unlawful. Even if he knows that 
he is committing an atrocity, it seems hard to hold him responsible, 
since all his military training has stressed instant and unquestioning 
obedience. 
What is the average Nazi or Japanese soldier's choice? He can 
ddy a shocking command and be disciplined-perhaps shot on the 
spot-or obey it and later be charged by the United Nations with 
murder in violation of the customs and laws of war. 
This situation is illustrated by a German officer of the last war. 
Accused of atrocities in a Belgian village, he replied, "Yes, I know 
it was contrary to the law of nations, for I am a doctor of law. 
I did not wish to do it, but I did it in obedience to the formal order 
of the Governor General of Brussels." 
On the other hand, the American Articles of War protect a 
soldier or officer who disobeys an obviously unlawful command. 
Every Nazi soldier or member of the Gestapo knows, when 
commanded to electrocute or gas civilians or pr::,oners of war, that 
he is perpetrating a foul deed. If he is strongly indoctrinated with 
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perverted ideas of morality, he may even commit the crime will-
ingly. Should he be protected by claiming obedience to a superior's 
order? 
To get to the bottom of this dilemma, let us examine American, 
British, and German thinking on the subject, as reflected in court 
decisions growing out of actual cases. 
An EarJy Precedent 
One of the most famous precedents on the subject of a superior's 
orders is the "Maxwell Case" dating from the Napoleonic Wars. 
French prisoners in a Scottish jail had neglected to extinguish a 
light in their cell window when ordered to do so by a guard. This 
guard, under the direct orders of Ensign Maxwell, fired at the light, 
killing one of the prisoners. Maxwell was tried and convicted of 
murder by the High Court of Justiciary of Scotland. His plea that 
he was acting under orders of higher officers was rejected. The 
court declared that "every officer has a discretion to disobey orders 
against the known laws of the land." 
The American V iew 
A famous American case is that of Mitch ell v. Harmony~ a civil 
suit growing out of the Mexican War. An American Army officer 
in Mexico illegally seized the goods of a trader in occupied terri-
tory. When later sued for the price of the goods, he claimed to 
have acted under orders of a superior officer. The court refused 
to consider this plea. Chief Justice Taney of the United States 
Supreme Court declared: "It can never be maintained that a 
military officer can justify himself for doing an unlaw ful act by 
producing the order of his superior. The order may palliate~ but 
it cannot justify" the deed. 
In another well-known American case, The United States v. John 
Jones, some members of the crew of an American privateer were 
tried because, during the War of 1812, they stopped and searched 
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a neutral Portuguese vessel on the high seas, a saulted the captam 
and crew, and stole valuables. They were held guilty of the act. . 
With reference to the defense of Jones and the others that they 
had only obeyed their captain's orders, the Justice said: "This 
doctrine, ... alanning and unfounded, is repugnant to reason, 
and to the positive law of the land. No military or civil officer 
can command an inferior to violate the laws of his country; nor 
will such command excuse, much less justify the act. Can it be for 
a moment pretended, that the general of an army, or the com-
mander of a ship of war, can order one of his men to commit 
murder or felony? Certainly not." 
In some later American decisions, however, there is a tendency 
to stress the military point of view. The absolute rule which holds 
the soldier responsible if the order turns out in fact to have been 
unlawful is qualified in these decisions. They tend to grant im-
munity if the soldier obeyed an order which was not "palpably" 
illegal. Whatever may be the practice in military tribunals, it 
cannot be said that the true American judicial rule has as yet 
been definitely settled. 
The English View 
Under English law a soldier has a somewhat more favorable 
position than under most American decisions. 
A leading case in English legal history is that of Regina v. Smith. 
During the Boer War a patrol of British soldiers, sent out on a 
dangerous mission, had an argument with a native who hesitated 
to find a bridle for them. Smith, one of the soldiers, under orders 
of his superiors, killed the native on the spot. After the war, a 
special court tried Smith for murder and acquitted him. The 
court said, "I think it is a safe rule to lay down that if a soldier 
believes he. is doing his duty in obeying commands of his superior, 
and if the orders are not so manifestly illegal that he must or ought 
to have known they were unlawful, the private soldier would be 
protected by the orders of his superior officer." 
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The German View 
In the llandovery Castle case the submarine officers Dithmar and 
Boldt claimed that they were carrying out their superior's command 
to sink the lifeboats. The German Supreme Court turned a deaf 
ear to their plea and declared, "Military subordinates are under 
no obligation to question the order of their superior officers, and 
they can count upon its legality. But no such confidence can be 
held to exist if such an order is universally known to everybody, 
including also the accused, to be without any doubt whatever 
against the law .... They should, therefore, have refused to obey. 
As they did not do so, they must be punished." 
A Suggested Rule 
What seems to be needed, according to some students of the 
problem, is a rule that will serve as a check upon extreme brutality 
and at the same time take account of the soldier's peculiar position 
" between the devil and the deep blue sea." 
The following rule has been suggested for adoption by an inter-
national criminal court as most nearly meeting these requirements 
(a suming, of course, that it is supplemented by a sound sentencing 
policy): The act of a soldier in obedience to a military order of 
his uperior is not justifiable if, when he committed it, he either 
actually knew or, under the circumstances, had reasonable ground ' 
for knowing that the act ordered is illegal either under the laws 
and .customs of warfare or under the criminal law of his country; 
a n:! when the two systems clash, the former shall prevail. 
The final proviso is included because otherwise the most lawless 
nations could easily whitewash their soldiers for the most flagrant 
violations of the law of nations by simply declaring their acts, if 
done against the enemy, to be always lawful under their own law. 
Normally, the law to be applied in order to determine the illegality 
of the order that resulted in atrocities would have to be the law of 
the accused man's country. He could not be expected to know the 
_ law of the enemy nation that prosecutes him. However, the laws 
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and customs of war, as well as the ordinary principles of criminal 
law, are generally known and applicable in Germany, J apan, and 
other Axis countries. Incidentally, a non-German court can legiti-
mately ignore" some of the Nazi legislation-such as that which 
denies legal status to Jews and other "non-Aryans"-because it is. 
so contrary to the elementary principles of justice and fair play. 
While a sovereign nation is free to adopt any legislation it sees fit, 
the family of civilized nations is not bound to recognize the erratic 
Nazi laws. 
A rule such as that described above can avoid harsh results if 
the sentencing procedure after conviction makes allowances for 
the rank of the ~ccused and if his punishment is lessened in certain 
circumstances, such as the following: he was not entirely a free 
agent; there was no way for him to know definitely that he was. 
violating the laws and customs of legitimate warfare; the illegal 
order was obeyed under stress, at a period of great danger, during 
hostilities, or the like; the command required instant obedience in 
carrying out an act that could not be postponed. 
If these considerations were applied, many ordinary soldiers 
would get off with nominal or slight punishment, while officer 
who had more knowledge of the law and greater freedom of action 
would be punished more severely. The defense of superior orders 
and supptementary leniency should, however, perhaps not apply 
to the various private Nazi militias, such as the Elite Guards and 
Storm Troopers. Even if it should tum out that they had b en 
made part of the German army by law or decree, they clearly do 
not deserve the usual protection accorded to soldiers. They orig-
inated as private volunteer corps, and at least in a general way 
their members knew when they enlisted of the crimes that were 
expected of them. 
ARE CHIEFS OF STATE LIABLE? 
After the last war, one of the major questions in dealing with 
war criminals was the responsibility of chiefs of state-particularly 
the Kaiser-for' the atrocities committed by their subjects. 
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Article 227 of the Versailles Treaty charged the former Emperor 
William II "with a supreme offense against international morality 
and the sanctity of treaties." The Allies wanted to put the Kaiser 
on trial, but he had renounced the throne shortly before the Armis-
tice and fled to Holland. The Dutch refused to give him up. 
Will the same thing happen to Hitler or Tojo or their henchmen? 
Indeed, what is the status, under the law of nations, of a chief of 
state? Is Hitler-the Fuhrer in whose name and upon whose 
authority so many of the Nazi crimes have been committed-to be 
pursued "to the ends of the earth," as the Moscow Statement says, 
and brought to trial? 
After the last war, not all authorities agreed that chiefs of state 
were punishable as war criminals. 
The French accused the Kaiser of being fundamentally respon-
sible for the atrocities committed by the generals and others under 
him. "It was necessary," they said, "to go beyond the individual, 
the actual author of the act complained of; it was necessary to 
search for the chiefs; from chief to chief. ... In the German 
Army there is one supreme chief, the Emperor. Let us know, for 
example, whether the act of General Stenger, who was accused 
of having issued a proclamation ordering his troops to give no quar-
ter, was ever disavowed. We do not know whether)t was .so or not; 
but it is certain that this proclamation reached the ears of the 
Kai er and it is he who is responsible." The Kaiser, of course, "did 
not give directly all the barbarous orders issued by his generals, but 
the latter knew that their acts had his approval; they were only 
the executors, high or low, of measures decreed by their master 
who felicitated, decorated, or promoted those who distinguished 
themselves by their ferocity." 
So argued the French. The American merr bers of the Commis-
sion of Responsibilities thought differently. They "admitted that 
from the moral point of view the head of a state, be he termed 
emperor, king or chief executive, is respomible to mankind, but .. . 
from the legal point they expressed themselves as unable to see .. . 
that the head of a state exercising sovereign rights is responsible to 
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any but those who have confided those rights to him by consent, 
express or implied." According to this view, the heads of states 
are responsible only to their people and should not be made respon-
. ible to any other nation. 
In the light of subsequent events some people challenge this 
American opinion and endorse the French view for the following 
reasons: The immunity granted a chief of state by other nations 
has nothing to do with the immunity he may enjoy inside his own 
country. It is based only on international courtesy, and this courtesy 
depends on whether the sovereign in question conducted himself 
as a law-abiding and trustworthy chief of state. By invading neigh-
boring countries, by violating treaties, and by exterminating masses 
of human beings without cause, a sovereign loses, according to those 
who hold this view, any immunity he might claim under inter-
national law. 
Unless the doctrine of immunity is so interpreted, it is argued, 
the most brutal and aggressive ruler would always be protected. 
If he won the war, he would not only escape punishment but deal 
roughly with the losers. If he lost it, he would always be sure to 
save his own skin. Since prisoners of war are subject to trial for 
violating the laws and customs of war, why should rulers who can 
be made prisoners of war get away scot-free? Moreover, would 
it be just to punish underlings who were forced to carry out illegal 
orders and yet spare the leader who deliberately planned and 
ordered wholesale atrocities? 
It seems to many people that the Allies made a serious mistake 
at the end of the last war by not formally accusing the ex-Kaiser 
of the crimes of murder, robbery, kidnaping, and the like. Had 
they done so, Holland's legal position for refusing to extradite 
vViIliam II on the ground that he was only a political refugee 
would have been far less secure. 
To set an example of fair and just proceedings the United 
Nations must, it seems to many students of the problem, subject 
Hitler and other Axis chiefs of state to trial by an international 
criminal court. 
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What Lord Birkenhead, attorney general of England, said of the 
Kaiser might be said of Hitler: "If this man escapes, common 
people will say tyerywhere that he has escaped because he is an 
Emperor [chief of state]. In my judgment they will be right .... 
It is not desirable that such things should be said, especially in 
these days. It is necessary for all time to teach the lesson that 
failure is not the only risk which a man possessing at the moment 
in any country despotic powers, and taking the awful decision 
between Peace and War, has to fear. . . . If ever again that deci-
sion should be . . . at the disposition of an individual, le~ the 
ruler who decides upon war know that he is Rambling, amongst 
other hazards, with his own personal safety." 
GETTING HOLD OF THE ACCUSED 
Determining how, and where, and by what laws to try the war 
offenders represents one group of problems. Getting hold of the 
accused is another. 
In the Armistice that concluded the last World War, the Allies 
agreed not to prosecute the war criminal found in occupied Ger-
many until the peace treaty came into force. This proved to be a 
mistake which probably will not be repeated. The known male-
factors this time will doubtless be seized promptly and put on trial 
without delay. 
War criminals caught by United Nations forces on non-German 
soil will, under the Moscow Statement of November 1, 1943, be 
held for international prosecution or turned over for trial to the 
authorities of those countries where their atrocities were committed. 
In this connection the United Nations should have little difficulty 
in exchanging offenders among each other. The tedious technical 
process of extradition will not be necessary if a satisfactory agree-
ment is made beforehand. 
So also, the offenders taken inside Germany will be turned over. 
perhaps, as part of the surrender teI'IIls, to the proper national 
tribunals or detained for trial jointly by the United Nations. 
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The Right to Give Asylum 
One of the most perplexing tasks in rounding up the accused 
after the war WIll be to get hold of those major offenders who will 
have fled-by plane, submarine, ship, or otherwise-to some neutral 
country, where they will do everything possible to resist extradition. 
We can be sure that many Japanese and Nazi chieftains have de-
posited vast sums of money in neutral countries with which they 
could hire expensive counsel and attempt to bribe officials, hoping, 
like the Kaiser, to live out their days in peace and plenty. 
To prevent this very occurrence, President Roosevelt on July 3, 
1943 warned all the neutral nations that: "One day Hitler and 
his gang and Tojo and his gang will be trying to escape from their 
countries. I find it difficult to believe that any neutral country 
would give asylum to or extend protection to any of them. I can 
only say that ... the United States Government hopes that no 
neutral government will permit its territory to be used as a place 
of refuge or otherwise assist such persons in any effort to escape 
their just deserts." 
This warning was supported by Great Britain and a similar note 
was sent by the Soviet Union to Turkey and Sweden. 
By the summer of 1944 few neutrals remained- those still so 
considered were Argentina, Eire, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, 
Sweden, Turkey, and the Vatican City. The governr -ent of Switzer-
land took notice of President Roosevelt's warning wii:h the remark 
that it would "obviously exercise its rights of asylum in a manner 
to assure fully the sovereignty and highest interests of the country." 
The Argentine government noted that asylum "can be granted only 
for political motives or crimes," and that only the government 
granting asylum can determine what is or is not a political offense. 
Plugging Up the Loopholes 
In view of Switzerland's and ArgentinaJs responses, it is 
reasonable to expect some difficulties in getting war criminals 
extradited from neutral countries. The Kaiser avoided trial be-
cau e Holland regarded him as a political refugee, not a war 
criminal. 
The loopholes in existing extradition treaties might, therefore, be 
plugged up beforehand, as the London Commission on War Crim-
inals (of the International Assembly, League of Nations Union) 
has suggested: "A separate and temporary agreement [should be 
made by the United Nations] with the neutral countries, concerning 
only war criminals. Without modifying anything in the existing 
extradition treaties, those countries should, during a limited periodJ 
after the war, be asked to undertake to deliver to the United 
Nations all persons accused of such war crimes. The list of those 
crimes should of course be drafted, and a new word, such a 
'delivery,' should be used in this respect to avoid confusion with 
ordinary extradition. In the agreement it should be specified . . . 
that the traditional custom of refusing extradition when the crime 
was of a political nature does not apply to delivery; that delivery 
will take place ven if exemption from punishment has been ac-
quired by lapse of time; that the circum tance that the crime for 
which delivery j demanded is punishable by death shall not be a 
reason for refusing it; that the circums~ance that the accused al-
leges to have committed the crime by order of his superior will 
not be a rea on for refusing delivery." 
It remains to be seen, first, whether ~he neutral countries who 
are proud of their ancient rights of asylum-like Switzerland-will 
sign such an agreement as the commission proposed, and second, 
whether, if the agreements are signed, we can get hold of the wily 
war criminals, who will scurry to all ends of the earth and use all 
their cunning to avoid falling into the United Nations hands. An 
influential Swiss newspaper recently said, while taking the stand 
that "granting sanctuary" is Switzerland's own business, "Let u 
hope that no one in Switzerland will be in favor of sanctuary being 
granted to those having to answer for war crimes." And a Swedish 
new paper wrote in 1943 that "If pyromaniacs, murderers, and 
thieves succeed in coming to power in a country, they cannot escape 
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punishment by crossing the frontier into another country when their 
time is up." 
Meanwhile it is widely recognized that no time should be lost 
by all the . United Nations in preparing lists of accused malefactors 
and collecting evidence, as the Soviet, Polish, Norwegian, and other 
governments are doing. In order to close the avenues of escape, 
public opinion in neutral countries could be prepared to accept the 
demands that wiJl be placed upon them after the war if the accused 
seek sanctuary on their soil. The peoples who have suffered from 
the Axis atrocities may not be willing to let the offenders live 
serenely and happily on neutral ground and die peacefully of old 
age as the ex-Kaiser did in his castle at Doorn. 
HOW SHALL THE GUILTY BE PUNISHED? 
Many people believe that the United Nations, either individually 
or jointly, should dispose of all Axis war criminals by shooting or 
hanging. A little reflection, however, shows that this solution of 
the problem, though simple, might be contrary to the best interests 
of the peoples who have suffered from the Axis cruelties. Apart 
from this, the question has been raised whether capital punishment 
for most of the guilty is in harmony with scientific criminology and 
penology. 
In the United States we regard every offender as an individual. 
His assets and liabilities are studied and a program is planned to 
make the most of his abilities, develop new ones, curb his bad 
habits, and gradually restore him to a useful and law-abiding place 
in society. Should this policy be followed for the war criminals? 
This is a difficult question to answer. For ordinary offenders, 
society can afford to experiment with the humane approach, and 
the public, even the victims and their families, can be made to 
• agree to a policy of rehabilitation. In the case of war offenders 
of the Axis type, who have committed thousands of shocking 
atrocities, measures of cure and rehabilitation of the individual 
offender according to his needs would be interpreted (especially 
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by the surviving victims of Axis brutality) as undeserved leniency. 
In the end, doubtless, the laws of every country where the war 
criminals are tried will determine the type of punishment. 
If the chiefs of state and their henchmen are tried by an inter-
national criminal court, it should be remembered that, such an 
organ of justice does not have its own prison establishment or 
psychiatric and reformatory institutions. It would have to create 
its- own bureau of punishment and correction; make arrangements 
for housing, feeding, and giving work to prisoners; keep track of 
their progress; and consider applications for parole. 
If the feelings of the occupied countries are taken into account, 
however, death would be the punishment for all the leading Nazi 
and Japanese offenders. This would of cour e solve the problem 
of providing prisons and other places of detention. On the other 
hand, it is argued by some that, for political and economic reasons 
and to avoid creating "martyrs," it might be wiser to impose sen-
tences of death on certain leaders and then commute them to 
prison terms at hard labor for life, perhaps on lonely islands in 
distant seas, whence escape would be impossible. The example of 
Napoleon banished to the island of St. Helena is mentioned as a 
precedent. 
In the case of many prominent Axis criminals it is perhaps useless 
to attempt correcti'on and rehabilitation. They could be studied 
by psychiatric clinics, however, so that we might learn what made 
these men defy the laws of civilization and lead millions of their 
fellow countrymen to an orgy of death and destruction. We might 
learn a great deal about international gangsterism if we kn w what 
made these men tick. 
For the younger offenders reeducation and rehabilitation might 
be prescribed with a view to helping them to shed the horrible 
Nazi and Japanese doctrines and gradually become good citizens. 
It is generally agreed that the United Nations should force Ger-
many, J apan, and their satellites to pay the expenses of the trials 
and the cost of detaining, correcting, and rehabilitating the war 
criminals. Before the war ends the United Nations Commission on 
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War Criminals will probably work out policy agreements among 
the go~ernments concerned for (1) the classificatipn of offenders; 
(2) the use of penal and correctional facilities by the proposrd 
international court; (3) employment of prison labor in th~ devas-
tated areas; and (4) other measures that will be necessary for 
carrying out the verdicts of courts of law. 
TO THE LEADER 
The "War Criminals" problem will face us again at the close of 
thi war as it did in 1918. The Mo cow Statement quoted at the 
beginning of the text lays down general principles. Working out 
ways of implementing these principles presents many knotty ques-
tions, but they are questions which are sure to be of interest to G. 1. 
discussion groups. 
Thi pamphlet is so organized as to be an eminently practical 
guide to you in conducting one or more discussions on the "War 
Criminals" problem. Use this material for forum, panel discussion, 
informal discus ion, or debate-whichever method is likely to be 
successful with your men. The techniques of all these types of 
meetings are outlined in EM 1, G. I. Roundtable: Guide for Dis-
cussion Leaders. The forum requires a good speaker who can 
address hi audience with authority. An infotmal discussion will be 
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successful with a relatively small group (30 people or less ) under 
the guidance of a I ader who can keep the discussion on the track. 
Panel discus ion requires about a half dozen individuals who will 
prepare themselves to carryon their orderly talk under a chairman 
and who can attempt to answer questions from the floor. Debate 
is an interesting form because it is a team competition; its dis-
advantage is that time for questions after the debate is difficult 
to arrange. 
Whatever form of meeting you select, the table of contents indi-
cates the major i ues to be discussed. Scattered through the text 
are many subsidiary question. You can make not s of ' these for 
your guidance in conducting the discussion. If the subject is to be 
properly covered within the time allotted, you are advised to plan 
orne scheme for apportioning the hour between your short intro-
duction and the major points it is necessary to have considered by 
the group. 
Material in thi pamphlet can easily be used for two meetings. 
It is suggested that you divid the major points for discussion as 
follow: 
First Meeting 
1. Who Are the "War Criminals"? (Pp. 2-5.) 
2. What Happened after the Last War? (Pp. 13-19.) 
3. Under What Laws Shall the United Nations Proceed? 
(Pp. 19-27.) 
Second Meeting 
4. Are "Superior Orders" a Legitimate Defense? (Pp. 27-32.) 
5. Are Chiefs of State Liable? (Pp. 32-35.) 
6. How Can the Accused Be Brought to Trial? (Pp. 35-38.) 
7. How Shall the Guilty Be Punished? (Pp.38-40.) 
A single meeting can also be planned to cover all seven points 
above. In this case you can perhaps include points 1 and 2 in a 
brief introductory talk and limit the general discussion to the last 
five points. 
Chart. You will find a rough chart which lists the major issues 
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a valuable aid in keeping the discussion from wandering too far 
afield. Be sure to have your lettering sufficiently large to be legible 
by all present .. 
Other questions for discussion are suggested below. You may 
wish to use them instead of or in addition to those suggested in the 
text. You may find in them suggestions for further discussion. 
1. Should we "forgive and forget," and not subject the enemy 
leaders and members of their military and political staffs to punish-
ment? Would you di~tinguish between the Germans and Japanese 
in this respect? 
2. Should we distinguish between the leaders and the followers? 
If so, where shall we draw the line? Shall we limit trial to Hitler, 
Mussolini, Tojo, and their henchmen? Shall we also subject to trial 
ann. punishment members of the German and Japanese general 
staffs who violated the laws and customs of legitimate warfare and 
civilized criminal law? Shall we include the leaders of the political 
secret police organizations? 
3. When it was suggested to a prominent international lawyer 
that heads of state are liable to trial and punishment by an inter-
national tribunal~ he asked whether Americans and Englishmen 
would accept the view that their own chiefs of state could be tried 
by foreign courts. What do you say to this question? Would the 
trial and execution of Hitler establish a "dangerous precedent" for 
the future? If trials are in an international tribunal, should it in-
clude some judges from enemy countries? Should it hear charges 
against other soldiers? 
4. If Hitler, Tojo, and Mussolini are executed, how can their 
"martyrization" by future generations of Germans, Japanese, and 
Italians be prevented? 
5. What about the defense of "superior orders"? Compare the 
American rule as found in the Rules 0/ Land War/are, the Ameri-
can rule enunciated in judicial decision, the English rule, the Ger-
man, and the French. 
6. Do you think an international criminal court should be estab-
lished? 
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7. If one is established should it confine its trial to the classes 
of cases suggested in this pamphlet? If not, how should the court's 
jurisdiction be modified? 
8. What do you think of the Germans' contention at the close 
of W orId War I that trial by a court established by the Allies 
would be one-sided and unfair? 
9. Do you think we ought to let German and Japanese war 
criminals be tried and punished in -their own countries, by their 
own courts, and under their own laws? 
10. Should Hitler, Mussolini, Tojo, and the other leaders be 
shot without trial, on the ground that their guilt is notorious and 
that trials would only give them a public forum for their antisocial 
views? 
11. Should capita l punishment be used in the more serious 
cases? Are you in favor of or opposed to capita l punishment for 
murders committed in your own state ? Are you consistent in your 
a ttitude ? I s there a basic distinction betweer the problem of pun-
ishing war criminals and that of punishing ordinary criminals ? 
12. Most modern American criminology is opposed to punish-
ment as an end in itself or as vengeance or retribution. It believes 
tha t the chief aim of "punishment" is reeduca tion, reform, and 
rehabilita tion of the offender. Do you believe in such an approach 
to the problem ? If so, how can you reconcile it with the p roposal 
to punish war criminals as an end in itself or by way of retribution 
or vengeance? 
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